Political outcomes are well understood to depend on the spatial distribution of citizen preferences. In this paper, we document that the same holds for the individual decision to be politically active. Using both cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence on turnout, we show that citizens are more likely to vote if they live in a jurisdiction with a larger number of persons sharing similar political preferences. As a result, changes in the identity of a district's median citizen lead to even larger changes in the identity of its median voter, a phenomenon we term electoral acceleration. We present evidence that electoral acceleration is in part due to the structure of media markets. Candidates find it easier to direct campaign efforts at larger groups because many existing media outlets cater to this audience.
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I. Introduction
What is the role of minority preferences in a democratic society? Few questions in political economy resonate as deeply as this one. Interestingly, the two most important concerns over minority preferences are diametrically opposed. On the one hand, minorities are seen as powerless. The "tyranny of the majority" has long been considered to be one of "the evils against which society requires to be on its guard" (Mill, 1859) .
Based on this concern, the Framers of the U.S. constitution sought to design democratic institutions that would render "the majority … unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression" (Madison, 1788) . In contrast to the view that democracy would leave minorities powerless, there is the fear, prominently expressed in Madison's discussion of factions, that small, but highly motivated groups might highjack the democratic process and exert undue influence. The superior ability of small groups to solve problems of collective action is one basis for the view that minorities are not powerless but, relative to their size, all too influential in democratic decision-making (Olson, 1971) .
In this paper, we address the question of minority influence by examining how electoral participation varies with the size of groups of citizens. Turnout is of interest not only because electoral participation is often seen as a basic democratic ideal (Lijphart, 1997) . Turnout also matters because systematic changes in the composition of the electorate lead to substantial changes in policy. For instance, the elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests in the United States led to a poorer pivotal voter and a sharp rise in welfare spending (Husted and Kenny, 1997) .
We show that citizens are more likely to participate in elections if they live in a jurisdiction with a higher concentration of persons sharing similar preferences in media content. In particular, we document that increases in the number of black citizens in a district make other blacks in the district more likely to vote and non-blacks less likely to participate in the election. Increases in the size of a group change the identity of the median citizen, and such a change in the identity of the median citizen leads to an even larger change in the identity of the median voter, a phenomenon we term electoral acceleration.
While the main contribution of this study is our empirical documentation that electoral acceleration occurs, we also offer empirical evidence on why it operates. It is well known that candidates can increase political participation by campaigning to groups of citizens (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994) . Most channels of communication used to disseminate campaign information -newspapers, radio and TV stations -carry considerable fixed cost, which can only be overcome if the demand for these products is sufficiently strong. For instance, radio stations or newspapers targeting a black audience only exist in places with many blacks (Waldfogel, 1999) . Where no black-targeted newspapers exist, candidates have difficulty reaching black citizens, and these citizens find it more costly to acquire information about candidates. Ultimately, such variation in the relative price of information appears to be translated into variation in voting tendencies for groups. Larger groups are more likely to be informed, and they are thus more likely to turn out. For instance, we show that increases in the number of blacktargeted weekly newspapers increase black turnout. A similar effect holds for blacktargeted radio stations. Both types of media products are more numerous in cities with a larger black population. Interestingly, the race of the stations' owner is important as well: While black-owned black-targeted stations increase turnout, we find no such effect for white-owned black-targeted stations.
Is electoral acceleration as documented in this study truly a causal effect? It is inherently difficult to document causal relationships in voting studies because individuals' voting tendencies are influenced by a multitude of unobservables. For example, blacks may choose to live disproportionately in places where all people, black or white, have elevated tendencies to vote. Alternatively, blacks with an unobserved "taste for voting" may migrate to places with high black concentrations. Possibilities such as these would give rise to a spurious correlation between group size and turnout.
We employ a number of cross sectional and longitudinal strategies to overcome these concerns. First, we perform estimates with local fixed effects common to blacks and whites, documenting that the tendency for blacks to vote, relative to whites, increases in the jurisdiction's black population share. Second, we construct longitudinal tests making use of the fact that we observe turnout in one presidential (1996) and in two nonpresidential years (1994 and 1998) . This allows us to ask how the black tendency to vote changes in 1996 relative to 1994/1998 and whether this change varies with the size of the local black population. We find that groups of locally isolated blacks experience a sharper increase in turnout during presidential contests than blacks in heavily black counties. This observation is consistent with the idea that the structure of media markets influences turnout. In the absence of black-targeted local media, locally isolated blacks have greater difficulty learning about local elections than blacks living in heavily black areas. In contrast, both groups can learn about presidential contests through national media coverage.
By highlighting the link between the structure of media markets and turnout, the present study makes a first attempt to integrate the literatures on political economy and the industrial organization of media markets. Recent voting studies (Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999; Gerber and Green, 2000) emphasize the importance of voter mobilization by political candidates. In modern electoral contests, such campaign efforts largely rely on mass media to disseminate information. Thus, it appears natural to ask how the structure of media markets influences mobilization efforts and ultimately turnout.
The paper proceeds in six sections. Section II discusses the role of the media in influencing turnout rates. Section III describes the data used in the study. Section IV presents evidence that political preferences differ between US blacks and whites. Section V describes the empirical strategy employed in the study and presents evidence of electoral acceleration. Section VI offers evidence for the mechanism that we posit. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings.
II. The Media and Political Participation
Political economy models of participation generally recognize two reasons why citizens vote: the prospects of changing the outcome of an election and the utility that voters get from the act of voting (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) . The chief difficulty of explaining rational turnout in the standard framework is that both decision-theoretic and game-theoretic reasoning suggest that the probability of being decisive in a large electorate is essentially zero. 1 Thus, the rational model is reduced to stating that citizens will participate if the direct benefits of voting outweigh the costs of participation.
This tautology is of course only helpful if one can add more structure to the problem.
In this study, we focus on the voters' cost of learning about the candidates'
proposed policies, a component of the overall cost of participating in elections.
Empirical studies indicate that citizens are reluctant to cast their vote if they feel ill informed (Palfrey and Poole, 1987) . For instance, they often abstain from voting in obscure races, even in situations where they have already borne the cost of going to the polls (Matsusaka, 1995) . By providing information through campaign efforts, candidates can reduce citizens' overall cost of voting and thus increase the likelihood of participation.
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The media -television, newspapers and radio -are an important channel to disseminate campaign information (Strömberg, 1999a) . The basic premise of our approach is that candidates will find it easier to campaign to those who read papers and watch television. Whether or not individuals consume media products depends on their preferences for news and entertainment and on the quality of the match between those 1 In models where the probability of being decisive is determined endogenously, turnout can be substantial if voters have complete information about the preferences and voting costs of every other voter (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984) . However, with less than full information, the only voters that participate in elections are citizens whose direct utility of voting outweighs the costs of participation (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985) . This result implies that, at least for large electorates, the variation in turnout rates is likely to be explained by variation in the direct benefits and costs of voting. 2 There is good empirical evidence that campaign efforts increase turnout. A summary of experimental results is given in Gerber and Green (2000) . Further evidence comes from Cox and Munger, 1989; Bartels, 1993; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999. preferences and the programming that is on offer. The provision of media products generally carries considerable fixed cost, which reduces the number of different products that are available in the market. Thus, not all individuals will have access to products that are to their liking. In particular, individuals are more likely to find appealing programming if they are part of a larger group of consumers with similar preferences for news and entertainment.
Two mechanisms give rise to this relationship between the size of a group and the likelihood of consumption. First, larger markets support a greater variety of products and hence increase the likelihood that individuals find media products they like. For instance, black-targeted radio stations are only available in markets with many black citizens (Siegelman and Waldfogel, 1998; Waldfogel, 1999) . Second, for a given number of products that can be supported in a market, product positioning is responsive to the relative size of groups. For example, daily newspapers report more frequently about issues of interest to blacks in cities with a larger black share of population. This in turn increases black readership (George and Waldfogel, 2000) .
A simple example illustrates the role of entry and positioning for the decision to consume media products. For this example, we build on Hotelling's (1929) . For values of 1 < r , the equilibrium mix is always to the "right" of the median minority citizen,
. Furthermore, as the solutions to (1) indicate, the optimal mix moves closer to the position of the median minority citizen as the minority increases in size,
Hence, the number of minority listeners -and by implication the number of minority citizens who receive campaign messages -increases in the size of the minority. This is the product positioning effect discussed above. The larger the minority, the better is the match of minority preferences and media content.
Next, suppose the market is large enough to support two stations, which offer 1 x and 2 x , respectively. As above, stations maximize profits by choosing the locations that attract the largest number of listeners. When choosing their own mix, stations take the programming choice of the other station as given. We focus on cases where the minority's preferences are not too similar to the preferences of the majority. In particular, we assume that 2 ) ( Whether this suggested relationship is borne out in turnout data for the United States is the subject of our empirical work. Before we turn to our results, we discuss the data sources used in this study.
III. Data
This study draws on five sources of data. Voting data come from the 1994, 1996, and 1998 Consumer Population Surveys (CPS). Every two years the CPS asks individuals whether they voted in November. The dataset, which covers roughly 89,000 potential voters 7 in 1994, 78,000 in 1996, and 77,000 in 1998, also reports socioeconomic information about individuals, as well as geographic identifiers. While the 1994 CPS reports counties for all observations, county identifiers are available for only about a third of potential voters in 1996 and 1998. Table 1 shows how the raw tendency for US 6 The change for station 1 is 0 6 citizens over age 18 to vote varies between blacks and nonblacks in 1994, 1996, and 1998. 8 The data on group size in each state and county are drawn from the 1990 Census.
The variation in group shares across states and counties is considerable. As Table 2 shows, the unweighted average white population share of counties is 84.5 percent, and the median is 76.2 percent. The mean state black share is 8.6 percent, and the median is 1.7 percent. There is substantial variation, however. The 75 th , 90 th , and 95 th percentile states are 10, 30, and 41 percent black.
Whether or not differential turnout among white and black citizens influences policy hinges on the political preferences of the two groups. We characterize their policy preferences using data from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS has been administered since 1972. The question on political preferences that we use was asked in most years. These data include about 32,000 whites and 5,000 blacks.
The data for black-targeted weekly newspapers in each MSA is taken from Burrelle's Media Directory (2000) . The Directory classifies each of the 9,772 weekly newspapers in the United States according to its intended audience. 9 These audiences consist of twenty-three separate categories, including 224 papers in four categories we classify as black-targeted ("black," "black, general," " black, Hispanic," and "black, religious.") Data on the number of black-targeted radio stations in each metro area are derived from Duncan's American Radio (Duncan and Moon, 1997).
IV. Electoral Acceleration Among Black Citizens
We chose to document electoral acceleration for the groups of black and nonblack citizens for two reasons. First, electoral acceleration is likely to arise if groups of citizens have different media preferences. It is well known that the groups we study tend to consume different radio shows, TV programs and newspapers. For example, in the spring of 2001, seven out of the ten most popular TV shows among blacks were rated among the ten least popular shows among whites (Nielson Media Research, 2001 ).
Second, differences in the likelihood of political participation are mostly of interest if the political preferences of the minority differ from the views of the majority.
If blacks and whites had identical political preferences, a reduced tendency to vote among black citizens would hardly matter because, by catering to white voters, elected officials would implement policies which are also favored by blacks.
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How different are the policy preferences of white and black citizens? The GSS asks respondents "Are we spending too much, too little, or the right amount on…" the following 15 policies: space program, environment, health, city problems, crime, drugs, education, race problems, defense, foreign aid, welfare, highways, social security, mass transportation, and parks. Table 3 reports differences in policy preferences between black and non-black respondents. Given the categorical nature of the data, we estimate ordered probit models. The "Black-Nonblack" rows in Table 3 report, for each spending 10 Another possibility is that lawmakers direct beneficial programs at groups which can be reached via mass media. Strömberg (1999b) shows how New Deal spending was directed at those who owned radios. category, the model's predicted difference between the two groups in the probability of giving a particular answer. The results are striking: blacks' and nonblacks' answers differ significantly in all but one spending category (mass transportation). Relative to nonblacks, blacks think that the US government spends too little on 11 of 15 categories (except the space program, defense, and highways). These results indicate that blacks and nonblacks have different political preferences. Thus, if black participation varies with access to media products, such changes in turnout are likely to impact policymaking (Husted and Kenny, 1997) .
V. Documenting Electoral Acceleration
A. Empirical Implementation
We employ three basic empirical strategies for documenting the effect of group size on a citizen's tendency to vote. First, we examine the cross sectional relationship between her tendency to vote in a particular election year and, say, the fraction that are of her type in her jurisdiction. Second, by pooling black and nonblack data and including jurisdiction fixed effects, we examine the relationship between, say, the percent black and the gap between black and white turnout. Third, we make use of the contrast between local and higher-level (statewide or national) elections to construct longitudinal tests.
B. Specifications and Results
Cross-sectional Analyses
The simplest measurement framework one might employ is cross sectional,
where V i denotes whether the individual votes, X i contains individual characteristics (income and education dummies, age terms, whether she lives in an MSA), b s is the state black share (or the county black share b c ) and ν i is an error term. If, as we asserted in Section 2, the positioning of media products is responsive to the relative size of groups,
we expect α to be positive for blacks. In addition to using shares, we can also use the absolute levels of jurisdiction population. The size of the population is related to the likelihood of product entry and in turn individual consumption. Let W s be a state's nonblack population and B s the black population. Then the basic setup is
As product entry is more likely for larger groups, we expect A b > 0 for blacks.
State and county-level estimates for these models are reported in table 4. The results are quite striking. Increases in the black population share increase black and decrease white participation rates significantly both at the state and at the county level. The effects for the absolute population levels are more mixed. The size of the black population appears to matter at the county, but not at the state level. Age, income, and education perform as documented elsewhere in the literature (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Matsusaka and Palda, 1999 
In this model, µ s is the jurisdiction fixed effect and γ 2 , the coefficient on the black dummy × jurisdiction black population share, reflects the effect of the state's black share on the difference between black and nonblack voting tendencies. Table 5 reports these results for state-level variables. In 1994 and in 1998, blacks are significantly more likely to vote, relative to whites, in states with higher black population shares. We observe the same positive relationship in the presidential year, though the effect is much smaller and not statistically significant. This is our first hint that electoral acceleration operates differently in national and in local elections. We will return to this point below. In columns 3, 6 and 9, we include the interactions of b δ with both the black population share and with the absolute size of the black and the white populations. We find that the fraction black is a more important determinant of turnout.
Linear probability models using county-level data confirm the basic pattern: Blacks are more likely to turn out as the population share of blacks increases.
11 These estimates
show that electoral acceleration is not attributable to the kinds of places where blacks live.
Longitudinal Tests
The results above may still arise because politically engaged blacks choose to live in cities with many blacks. We address this concern with longitudinal tests comparing the changed tendency for blacks to vote in local and nonlocal elections. Consider two black citizens, the first living in a city with many blacks and black-targeted media products, the second in a city with few blacks and no local black-targeted media. In a year with only local elections, the locally isolated black citizen is hard for candidates to reach and he is relatively unlikely to participate in the local election. In the city with black-targeted media, local candidates can use these channels to disseminate campaign information, leading to a relatively higher likelihood of turning out for the black citizen in the more heavily black city.
In years with a presidential contest, both local and national media provide information. While the locally isolated black citizen had difficulty learning about local races, he can now rely on national media outlets to learn about presidential candidates.
The citizen in the more heavily black city also has access to information from local and national sources. However, as local sources already cover the presidential race from a perspective that is of interest to blacks, adding a national media outlet provides blacks in heavily black areas with less additional information than isolated blacks who have little exposure to local reporting. This suggests that turnout among locally isolated blacks should increase more sharply in the presence of a presidential race than turnout among blacks in more heavily black areas. This is the logic that underlies our longitudinal tests.
We start exploring this conjecture by asking whether blacks in predominantly white counties are more energized by statewide elections than blacks in heavily black counties. This question is best examined using election data from non-presidential years. δ , varies only by year × county in our sample. To account for this, we cluster standard errors on year × county. For counties whiter than average for the state, we expect the non-local media coverage of the statewide race to increase turnout more for isolated blacks. That is, we expect φ 3 to be negative for blacks. Columns (1) and (2) of table 6 report these results, for whites and blacks, respectively. We find that φ 3 is negative and significant for blacks and small and insignificant for whites.
This specification is arguably incomplete because the effect of black isolation should depend on how isolated blacks are in their states, relative to the state as a whole.
To accommodate this possibility, we augment specification (4) in three ways. First, we add the state black share interacted with a statewide election dummy, The higher the black population share at the state level, the greater the incentive for regional media to cater to black interests throughout the state. Hence, we expect φ 4 to be positive and, as before, φ 3 to be negative for blacks. Columns (3) and (4) of table 6 report these results. For blacks, φ 4 is positive and significant and φ 3 is negative and significant. Neither is significant for whites.
In a second modification of (4), we include a statewide dummy interacted with the county and the state black share. This allows the effect of the county black share to differ according to the black share of the state, Columns (5) and (6) of table 6 report these results, and φ 5 is not significant. A third possibility is a special case of (4a) that merits mention, namely φ 3 = -φ 4 . We test whether a county's excess of black share over the state share influences turnout using the following specification,
Differences in media coverage at the local and the regional or national level lead us to expect that φ 6 < 0 for blacks. Columns (7) and (8) report this specification. Consistent with our previous findings, φ 6 is negative and significant for blacks and small and insignificant for whites. That is, the increase in black turnout for a statewide race is larger, the larger the white population share of the county is relative to the state-level share of whites.
We can perform an analogous test with the presidential election year data. The question is whether the increase in black voter turnout in presidential years is larger for blacks isolated in predominantly white states than for blacks in more heavily black states.
The tests based on the presidential election are analogous to the statewide race tests, except that the presidential race, unlike statewide races, occurs everywhere simultaneously.
The simplest way to measure the effect is to run race-specific regressions with year dummies, state fixed effects, the interaction of state black share with the 1996 dummy, and demographic controls. We also include a statewide election dummy, along with its interaction with the state's percent black. , varies by year within state, and we cluster standard errors correspondingly. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 , we estimate the coefficient to be -0.22 for blacks and 0.21 for whites, indicating that states with higher black shares experience smaller increases in black turnout in presidential elections, relative to other elections. This indicates that the presidential election raises turnout among blacks more as they are more isolated in predominantly white states. We can also estimate specification (5) with county instead of state-level shares of blacks. The county results show the same pattern as our state-level findings. A presidential contest is particularly effective in raising turnout among locally isolated blacks (results available upon request).
Because we have two years of non-presidential election data, we can allow for state-and race-specific time trends in turnout: Tables 4-7 provide considerable evidence that electoral acceleration operates. As black citizens make up a larger share of the population, they become more inclined to participate in elections. There are many possible reasons for the cross-sectional relationships that we observe. For instance, politically more active black citizens may choose to live in cities with larger black populations. However, this type of unobserved heterogeneity cannot account for our longitudinal results. Because the same people live in each jurisdiction during both the local and nonlocal elections, the changed turnout in local vs. nonlocal elections does not reflect the way that blacks sort themselves into communities. 12 In the next section, we investigate more closely one of the mechanisms that can give rise to electoral acceleration, the availability of minority-targeted media outlets. 12 The results can arise if blacks move to white states or counties only to the extent that they lack interest in local, but not in national, affairs. This seems implausible.
VI. Mechanism
Our arguments in Section 2 suggest that the structure of media markets may be one reason why electoral acceleration exists. In this section, we explore this mechanism empirically, using newspapers and radio stations as examples for channels of communication that can be used to disseminate political information.
The first two columns of table 8 present regressions of the white and black tendency to vote on the number of black-targeted newspapers in the MSA. We estimate linear probability models because of the large numbers of MSA fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors on MSA. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that a larger number of black-targeted media outlets increases black participation rates. The number of weeklies bears a positive relationship to the black tendency to vote, but none to white participation rates. Column 3 includes a MSA fixed effect and confirms that, relative to whites, blacks are more likely to vote in MSAs with more black weeklies. In columns 4, 5 and 6 of table 8, we repeat the analysis for black weeklies with the number of black-targeted radio stations. Again, we find that the number of black-targeted stations bears a positive relationship to differences between black and white voting tendencies. As the results in columns 3 and 6 indicate, the positive effect of the number of minority-targeted media outlets on minority participation is not due to fixed unobserved differences between MSAs.
The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) has long pursued policies promoting minority ownership of broadcast media, so from a public policy perspective, it is interesting to ask whether white and black owners of minority-targeted radio stations offer the same inducement for blacks to participate in elections. We might expect to find race-specific ownership effects if black owners receive greater benefits than whites from disseminating political information that is of interest to blacks. 13 In columns 7, 8 and 9, we distinguish between black-owned and white-owned black-targeted stations. Both types of stations induce blacks to vote, while there is no effect on white participation rates.
The results in Table 8 appear to confirm that greater access to media increases the likelihood of participating in elections. However, there is a concern that the number of media outlets is endogenously determined with the tendency to vote. We address this issue with a different identification strategy based on changes in the number of black- Using longitudinal data on black-targeted media and voting, we can thus ask how the black voting tendency changes, 1994 to 1998, with changes in the number of blacktargeted media outlets. The first two columns of table 9 show regressions of white and black voting tendencies on a 1998 dummy, the number of local black-targeted radio stations, which can substantially change between the two time periods as a result of the change in legislation, and MSA fixed effects. We find that the white voting tendency is unaffected by the number of black-targeted radio stations, while black participation rates increase in the number of stations. These results, consistent with our cross sectional findings, are not due to fixed unobserved heterogeneity.
Columns 3 and 4 show that black-targeted stations affect voting differently according to whether the stations are black-owned. Black-owned and targeted stations have a large effect on black voting (and a much smaller, albeit significant, positive impact on white voting), while white-owned black-targeted stations have no significant impact on black or white voting. This finding suggests that ownership has a consequential effect on content, even within stations that are targeted at black audiences.
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The results in tables 8 and 9 provide reasonable support for the view that electoral acceleration is at least in part due to the structure of media markets. As the size of a group increases, members of this group can enjoy a larger number of media products that are specifically tailored to their tastes. The existence of these channels of communication make it easier for candidates to target campaign efforts at the group, thereby lowering the costs of learning about the candidates' positions and thus increasing the likelihood of participation.
VII. Concluding Discussion
Theories of democratic decision-making have long recognized that policy outcomes depend on the spatial distribution of citizen preferences. In the standard median voter model, for example, "moving" types from one jurisdiction to the next affects policy by changing the identity of the median citizen. The novel empirical result of this study is that the tendency to participate in elections also depends on the distribution of types. Electoral acceleration produces a systematic bias between the median voter and the median citizen toward the group whose participation is augmented by its larger share.
But how large is this deviation? Our estimates allow us to calculate this. If 
We calculated p V using our cross sectional specification (3) with county-level data for 1998. When p is 0, so is p V . At the median black population share (1.7%), the black share of voters is 30% below the black share of population (χ 2 = 45.36). At the 75 th percentile, the difference is 21% (χ 2 = 10.84). It is only at the 95 th percentile of the black population share (41%) that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the black population share is equal to the share of black voters. Given the sharp differences in policy preferences between blacks and non-blacks that we documented in Section IV, it appears likely that the considerable gap between the black population share and the fraction of the electorate that is black has a considerable influence on policy-making. As demonstrated earlier, the gap tends to be smaller in years with presidential elections. Using the same specification (3) with county-level data for the presidential year 1996, we only find significant differences up to the 90 th percentile of the black population share, where the gap amounts to 3% (χ 2 = 6.14).
Our work addresses differences between black and white voting tendencies because whites and blacks belong to different groups: They have substantially different political preferences, and they tend to consume different media products. However, for our study, it is not necessary that race causes blacks and whites to belong to different groups. In contrast to the approach taken here, there is a substantial literature which assumes that race determines the likelihood of political participation (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990) . 15 Several papers maintain that a strong sense of "ethnic community" and "black consciousness" influences turnout rates (Verba and Nie, 1972; Shingles, 1981) . Studies using data from the 1950s and 1960s generally find that blacks are more likely to participate than whites when one controls for demographic differences. More recent analyses for the late 1980s indicate that such differences have disappeared (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990 ).
Our study of electoral acceleration contributes to this literature by emphasizing that some of the differences in participation between blacks and whites may be interpreted as stemming from differences in the fraction of the population that is black.
To our knowledge, this hypothesis has not been tested in previous studies. Rather than 15 Some studies identify race-specific institutional differences such as voter literacy tests, poll taxes (Filer, Kenny and Morton, 1991) , and political resources in general (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980) as reasons why turnout rates may differ between races. Others emphasize racial differences in socioeconomic status (Olsen, 1970; Verba and Nie, 1972) . More generally, we see the current paper as a first attempt to integrate the political economy and industrial organization literatures to further our understanding of political participation. Recent voting studies (Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999; Gerber and Green, 2000) emphasize the importance of voter mobilization by political elites. While there is little doubt that such mobilization efforts are successful, it is not obvious why citizens should go to the polls if candidates call on them to do so. This paper offers an information-based interpretation of voter mobilization. Citizens are more likely to turn out if their search for political information is subsidized through campaign efforts. In modern electoral contests, most campaign information is disseminated via mass media.
The current study is novel in that it documents how the structure of media markets leaves an imprint on patterns of turnout.
Following Olson (1971) and Becker (1983) , there has been much interest in instances where small groups have a disproportionately large influence on policy outcomes. Electoral acceleration provides an example for a mechanism which puts small groups at a disadvantage. While the ability to solve problems of collective action undoubtedly contributes to a group's political effectiveness, our findings highlight the importance of other determinants of political influence which run counter to the intuition that small groups generally enjoy a relative competitive advantage.
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